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COMMENTS 
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act of .1927: Half-Way 
Protection for the Stevedore and the 
Longshoreman 
The longshoreman is unique among industrial employees in 
several ways. First, his occupation involves innumerable crossings 
over the ill-defined line which separates land from navigable waters. 
Second, in the course of his employment he is likely to spend a great 
amount of time on premises (a vessel) maintained by a party (a 
shipowner) who is not his employer. Moreover, a longshoreman 
must often use equipment supplied by the shipowner. Partially 
because of these singular aspects of his employment, an injured 
longshoreman has a vast and potentially confusing array of remedies. 
Depending largely upon his location at the time of injury, he may 
have a right to recover by way of one or more of the following: an 
action under state workmen's compensation legislation against his 
employer (herein called a stevedore), a proceeding against the steve-
dore under a federal compensation act, and a. damage action against 
the shipowner for both unseaworthiness and negligence.1 The chart 
on the next page sets forth in an oversimplified fashion the principal 
remedies available to employees injured on or near navigable waters. 
The law relating to longshoremen's remedies abounds with sur-
prising anomalies, hyper-technical distinctions, and bits and pieces 
of judicial legislation. This situation stems largely from deficiencies 
in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 
1927,2 an inherently inadequate statute greatly distorted by recent 
judicial interpretation. This Comment undertakes an examination 
of the act's most salient shortcomings with a view to suggesting pos-
sible guidelines for what is believed to be necessary corrective 
legislation. 3 
1. See generally Gainsburgh & Fallon, Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co.: The 
Twilight's Last Gleaming?, 37 TuL. L. REv. 79 (1962); McKinstry, The Yaka Decision 
-Judidal Repeal of Section 5 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act, 31 INS. COUNSEL J. 90 (1964); Pillsbury, 'Stevedore's Duty To Indemnify 
Shipowners for Injuries to Longshoremen-Employees, 15 liAsTINGs L.J. 530 (1964); 
Shields & Byrne, Application of the "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine to Longshoremen, 
Ill U. PA. L. REv. 1137 (1963); Stover, Longshoreman-Shipowner-Stevedore: The Circle 
of Liability, 61 MICH. L. R.Ev. 539 (1963); Till & Bluestein, Amphibious Problems in 
State Workmen's Compensation Claims, 32 INS. COUNSEL J. 472 (1965); Weinstock, The 
Emplc,yer's Duty To Indemnify Shipowners for Damages Recovered by Harbor Work-
ers, 103 u. PA. L. R.Ev. 321 (1954); 37 TUL. L. REv. 786 (1963); 36 id. 134 (1961). 
2. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964). Although "harbor worker" is 
not defined in the act, the act's jurisdictional requirement indicates that Congress 
meant the legislation to cover only those harbor workers who, like longshoremen, 
work very near the water. 
3. An initial and sometimes difficult distinction must be made between a long-
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Persons Nature of 
Source of Relief Covered Liability Recovery Jurisdiction 
Merchant Marine Act of Seamen Negligence• Damages Land and 
19204 (Jones Act) navigable 
waters 
Longshoremen's and Harbor Longshore- Absolute .. Coml?en- Navigable 
Workers' Compensation men; sation waters 
Act of 19275 harbor scale only 
workers 
Seaworthiness warranty6 Seamen; Absolute• .. Damages Land and 
long- navigable 
shoremen waters 




Negligence law (business Harbor Negligence Damages Land and 




• The fellow-servant and assumption-of-risk defenses are eliminated; comparative 
negligence replaces contributory negligence. 
•• The employee is precluded if his injury resulted solely from his intoxication, 
... Contributory negligence will reduce a recovery. 
shoreman or harbor worker and a seaman. This distinction is crucial because § 3(a)(l) 
of the Longshoremen's Act excludes injuries suffered by "a master or member of a 
crew of any vessel" from the scope of the act. Moreover, the Merchant Marine Act 
of 1920, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. 688 (1958), popularly called the Jones Act, granting 
seamen an FELA-type damage remedy against their employers, is unavailable to long• 
shoremen because § 5 of the Longshoremen's Act makes compensation under the 
Longshoremen's Act a longshoreman's exclusive remedy against his employer. See text 
accompanying notes 56-58 infra. Thus, the Jones Act and the Longshoremen's Act arc 
mutually exclusive. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334 (1953); Desper v. 
Starved Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187 (1952). The fact that a person has accepted 
benefits under the Longshoremen's Act does not necessarily preclude his bringing a 
later suit under the Jones Act if the former award is offset against any subsequent 
recovery. See Lawrence v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 194 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Va. 1961), 
aff'd, 319 F.2d 805 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 952 (1963); GILMORE &: BLACK, 
.ADMIRALTY 355 (1957). The distinction seems to hinge on whether a particular em• 
ployee has a fairly permanent connection with the vessel and is on board "primarily 
to aid in navigation." If so, he is a seaman. See Texas Co. v. Savore, 240 F.2d 674 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 846 (1957); cf. Davis v. Department of Labor &: Indus., 
317 U.S. 249, 253 (1942). 
4. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). This act made the, damage remedy 
provided by the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 
45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964), applicable to seamen. Regarding the relevance of the Jones 
Act to longshoremen's relief, see note 3 supra. 
5. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964). 
6. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), which first extended the 
benefits of the seaworthiness warranty to longshoremen. See generally text accompa-
nying notes 59-70 infra. 
7. See generally 36 TUL. L. REv. 134 (1961). 
8. See Pope &: Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Lahde v. Soc, Armadora 
Del Norte, 220 F.2d 357 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955). The availability 
of this remedy is largely an academic question, for the unseaworthiness doctrine, 
under which recovery may be obtained without proof of negligence, will be available 
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I. THE NAVIGABLE WATERS REQUIREMENT: AN INADEQUACY FROM 
ITS INCEPTION 
The Longshoremen's Act was adopted in response to a series of 
Supreme Court decisions which made it clear that state compensa-
tion acts could not constitutionally afford relief to harbor workers 
injured on navigable waters.9 The admiralty law had to remain 
uniform; maritime injuries could not receive varying treatment un-
der different local laws.10 A void, intolerable in that era of work-
men's compensation ascendancy,U resulted; the inapplicability of 
state legislation meant that injured longshoremen were covered by 
no compensation statute. Congress quickly responded to the Court's 
prompting by adopting the Longshoremen's Act.12 However, the 
legislative history of the provision clearly indicates that, despite urg-
ings for a more extensive law, the act was intended to do no more 
than to fill the vacuum. Wherever possible, state compensation legis-
lation was to be applied.13 Therefore, a longshoreman was not cov-
ered by the new statute in a comprehensive, functional manner 
based upon his occupational status.14 Instead, section 3(a) provides 
him relief only if his "disability or death results from an injury 
occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including 
any dry dock) and if recovery for the disability or death through 
workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided 
by State law."15 
In performing his duties of loading and unloading, alongshore-
man constantly crosses between land and vessels or barges anchored 
upon navigable waters.16 Therefore, section 3(a) has inevitably gen-
in most instances in which a plaintiff could rely upon a common-law negligence 
theory. See GILMORE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 3, at 364. 
9. Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. 
Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). 
10. See cases cited note 9 supra. 
11. See I LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION I.Aw § 5.30 (1965 ed.). 
12. See generally Washington v. W. A. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 227-28 (1924). 
13. See Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 344 F.2d 640, 643-44 (2d Cir. 1965); 
Johnson v. Traynor, 243 F. Supp. 184 (D. Md. 1965). Prior to the passage of the 
Longshoremen's Act, the Supreme Court had declared unconstitutional two congres-
sional attempts to apply state compensation acts to longshoremen. Knickerbocker Ice 
Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) (declaring unconstitutional 40 Stat. 395 (1917) as 
an invalid attempt to delegate federal power to the states); Washington v. W. C. 
Dawson & Co., supra note 12 (declaring 42 Stat. 634 (1922) invalid on similar grounds). 
See generally GILMORE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 3, at 333-40. 
14. See Johnson v. Traynor, supra note 13, at 188-90; Clark, The Longshoreman and 
Accident Compensation, 22 MONTHLY LAlloR REv. 753, 756 (1926). 
15. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1424, 
33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1964). 
16. "Any rule that we [adopt in applying § 3(a)] ••• is necessarily arbitrary from the 
longshoreman's point of view because the boundary line between land and sea is 
crossed by a great deal of traffic and many injuries occur near the line." Michigan 
Mut. Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 344 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir. 1965) (Hays, J., dissenting). 
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erated much litigation, and the illogical and impractical jurisdic-
tional requirement which it established has given birth to a host 
of strained distinctions.17 For example, a longshoreman injured at 
any point on a gangplank is injured on navigable waters and is thus 
within the scope of the act, because a gangplank is considered an 
~xtension of a vessel.18 On the other hand, a harbor worker injured 
while standing on a pier is not within the protection of the act, 
because, although the injury might have occurred at a point over 
navigable waters, the entire pier is considered to be an extension of 
the land.19 Most difficult to resolve, however, are the jurisdictional 
questions arising in those cases where a longshoreman standing on 
land or an extension thereof either falls or is pushed into navigable 
waters and there sustains injury or drowns. Here resort is had to 
less manageable admiralty principles. 
A. The Locality Test 
Historically, the existence of an admiralty court's jurisdiction 
over suits arising from tortious conduct has been determined by the 
"locality test." In the landmark case of The Plymouth,20 the United 
States Supreme Court declared that in order for a tort to be con-
sidered "maritime," "the wrong and injury complained of must have 
been committed wholly upon the high seas or navigable waters, or, 
at least, the substance and consummation of the same must have 
taken place upon these waters .... "21 In thus establishing the locality 
test, the Court actually appears to have set forth two standards and 
seems to have ruled that an admiralty court can take jurisdiction of 
a tort action if either is satisfied. Moreover, the second guideline 
(substance and consummation) is certainly less precise than the first, 
and has been applied less strictly. For example, where one is pushed 
17. See Johnson v. Traynor, 243 F. Supp. 184, 189 n.4 (1965), where the court of• 
fered "as an illustration of the complexities and sometimes the absurdities of juris• 
diction problems the case of the fat longshoreman who, in falling, hit both the wharf 
[calling into effect local law] and the ship [calling into play the Longshoremen's 
Act] •••• " 
18. See The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649 (1935); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 
U.S. 205 (1917). 
19. Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1 (1946); State Indus. Comm'n v. Nordcnholt 
Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922); Hastings v. Mann, 340 F.2d 910, 911-12 (4th Cir, 1965). 
Section 3 expressly states that injuries occurring on dry docks are within the pur• 
view of the act. The term "dry dock." has been held to include marine railroads, 
with the result that a worker killed in an explosion on a barge drawn four hundred 
feet from the water's edge was held to be covered by the Longshoremen's Act in 
Avondale Marine Ways, Inc. v. Henderson, 201 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 
346 U.S. 366 (1953). The Avondale rule was significantly expanded in Holland v. Har• 
rison Bros. Dry Dock. &: Repair Yard, Inc., 306 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1962), reversing 
Harrison lkos. Dry Dock. &: Repair Yard, Inc. v. Donovan, 194 F. Supp. 303 (S.D. 
Ala. 1961). 
20. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865). 
21. Id. at 35. (Emphasis added.) 
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from a boat to a wharf and thereby injured, the standard that both 
the wrong and the injury must have occurred on navigable waters 
would not be met, and admiralty jurisdiction would be lacking.22 
However, the vagueness of the second test would enable a court to 
hold that the receipt of the blow aboard the vessel was the "sub-
stance and consummation" of the wrong and the injury necessary to 
render the tort "maritime," despite the fact that the victim's descent 
ended when he struck an extension of land. Of course, this reason-
ing would preclude the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction where a 
plaintiff was knocked from a wharf into navigable waters.23 
Where due to an unknown cause a person falls from a vessel 
onto a wharf, or from a wharf into navigable waters, it can be 
extremely difficult to determine where the "substance and consum-
mation" of the wrong and injury lies. In the wharf-to-water situ-
ation, it is certainly arguable that at least "the substance and con-
summation of the occurrence which gave rise to the cause of action" 
took place entirely in the water, for it cannot be shown that any 
blow or injury was sustained on the wharf.24 Nevertheless, some-
thing caused the unfortunate victim to fall; therefore, it can just 
as easily be contended that only the consummation of the occurrence 
actually happened upon navigable waters, in which case admiralty 
jurisdiction would be lacking. In deciding whether admiralty juris- -
diction is present in a particular case, a court can reach either an 
affirmative or a negative result by emphasizing the events which 
transpired on one side or the other of the line separating land from 
water. 
Since the Longshoremen's Act was designed to provide relief 
only in those cases in which state compensation legislation could 
not constitutionally be applied because the events from which a 
claim arose were within the exclusive cognizance of admiralty, it is 
not surprising that the locality test, originally formulated to deter-
mine the presence of admiralty jurisdiction over tort claims, was 
quickly adopted as an aid in deciding whether the navigable-waters 
.22. See The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649 (1935); Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal 
Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935); Caldaro v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 166 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y 
1956). But cf. The Stabro, 98 Fed. 998 (2d Cir. 1900) (court refused to read the 
Plymouth test literally and declared irrelevant the place of consummation); O'Donnell 
v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 42 (1943) ("[The] admiralty jurisdiction 
over the suit depends not on the place where the injury is inflicted but on the 
nature of the service [performed by the victim] and its relationship· to the operation 
of the vessel plying in navigable waters.'); Castillo v. Argonaut Trading Agency, Inc., 
156 F. Supp. 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Compare Thibodeaux v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 
276 F.2d 42, 49 (5th Cir. 1960), where it was suggested that the locality test 
"may well involve many variables and it may be that the ultimate decision can scarcely 
be made on such an easy mechanical, i.e., physical, basis [e.g., point at which the 
substance and consummation of an injury occurred]." 
23. See T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928); Wiper v. Great Lakes 
Eng'r Works, 340 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1965). 
24. Thibodeaux v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 276 F.2d 42, 49 (5th Cir. 1960). 
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jurisdictional requirement of the act had been satisfied.20 Thus, 
where a plaintiff had been knocked from a dock into the water, a 
strict interpretation df the locality test would deny him relief under 
the act because the wrong (or its equivalent in the context of work-
men's compensation legislation) and the injury had not both oc-
curred on navigable waters.26 The "substance and consummation" 
version of the locality test engenders the same difficulties when ap-
plied in connection with a claim brought under the act as it did in 
the context of a suit arising from an "amphibious tort."27 However, 
recent decisions have rendered questionable the viability of either 
form of the locality test in litigation under the Longshoremen's 
Act.28 
B. The Line Moves Shoreward 
In Interlake Steamship Go. v. Nielsen,20 a shipkeeper who had 
driven his car off a dock and into Lake Erie in the course of inspect-
ing a moored vessel was deemed to have been covered by the Long-
shoremen's Act. Since there was a complete lack of evidence showing 
what had caused the car to leave the pier, the court might have 
spoken in terms of "substance and consummation" and reached its 
result by reference to the locality test.30 Nevertheless, it chose to 
reject entirely the locality test precedents and to rely exclusively 
upon the fact that no evidence had been offered showing that any 
injury had been sustained until decedent's car had struck the frozen, 
but othenvise navigable, waters of the lake. It sought to justify its 
approach by referring to the "impact of the Admiralty Extension 
Act"31 and to recent Supreme Court dicta in Galbeck v. Travelers 
Ins. Co.82 that "Congress intended the [Longshoreman's] compen-
sation act to have a coverage co-extensive with the limits of its 
authority ... .''83 
The Admiralty Extension Act, adopted in 1948, did alter the 
historical locality test somewhat by extending admiralty jurisdiction 
to cover "all cases of damage or injury ... caused by a vessel on 
25. See Caldaro v. Baltimore &: Ohio R.R., 166 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1956). 
26. But cf. Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 238 F. Supp. 78, 81 (E.D. Va. 
1965), where it was suggested that if there had been no impact upon a person falling 
from land into water until he had hit the water, the Longshoremen's Act would apply. 
27. See Smith &: Son v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928); Thibodeaux v. J. Ray McDer• 
mott &: Co., 276 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1960). 
28. Interlake Steamship Co. v. Nielsen, 338 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1964); Gulf Oil Corp. 
v. O'Keeffe, 242 F. Supp. 881 (E.D.S.C. 1965); Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 
238 F. Supp. 78 (E.D. Va. 1965). 
29. 338 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1964). 
30. See text accompanying note 24 supra. 
31. 62 Stat. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964). 
32. 370 U.S. 114 (1962). 
33. Id. at 130. Actually, the Court in Calbeck was quoting from De Bardeleben 
Coal Corp. v. Henderson, 142 F.2d 481, 483-84 (5th Cir. 1944). 
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navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be 
done or consummated on land."34 However, the validity of the 
Nielsen court's placing even indirect reliance upon this legislation 
is dubious, for the Extension Act is, by its language, applicable 
only in cases in which a vessel has caused damage on land, and in 
Nielsen no vessel had caused any damage. Nevertheless, it has been 
argued~ although unsuccessfully, that by altering the locality test to 
bring some shoreside injuries within the scope of admiralty juris-
diction, the Extension Act has similarly expanded the coverage of 
the Longshoremen's Act to include injuries occurring entirely on 
land.36 This possibility was exhaustively explored in the recent case 
of Johnson v. Traynor.86 The express language of the Extension Act, 
the legislative.history of both statutes, and administrative interpre-
tations convinced the court that the Longshoremen's Act did not 
cover a person who had sustained an injury on a wharf. Indeed, the 
court felt that any other holding would have been the product of 
"the grossest type of judicial legislation."37 
The Nielsen court's reliance on Calbeck was equally misplaced, 
because in that case the Supreme Court was concerned only with 
the question whether injuries occurring on navigable waters should 
nevertheless be compensable under state law because the activity 
from which the harm arose was of purely "local concern."38 Indeed, 
34. Admiralty Extension Act, 62 Stat. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964). 
35. See, e.g., Gladden v. Stockard S.S. Co., 184 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1950); Michigan 
Mut. Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 233 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 640 (2d 1Cir. 
1965); Johnson v. Traynor, 243 F. Supp. 184 (D. Md. 1965). 
36. 243 F. Supp. 184 (D. Md. 1965). 
37. Id. at 192. "It can hardly be said that the Extension in Admiralty Act was also 
intended to amend the federal compensation act to include injuries occurring on land 
as well as 'upon the navigable waters.'" Revel v. American Export Lines, Inc., 162 
F. Supp. 279, 284 (E.D. Va. 1958), afj'd, 266 F.2d 82, 84 (4th Cir. 1959). 
The Nielsen court might have buttressed its position by citing § 20(a) of the 
Longshoremen's Act, which establishes a presumption that, in the absence of substan-
tial evidence to the contrary, a claim comes within the act. This argument was used 
in a case involving somewhat similar facts in Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 
238 F. Supp. 78, 79 (E.D. Va. 1965). But see Atlantic Stevedoring Co. v. O'Keeffe, 220 
F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Ga. 1963), where it was suggested that a distinction could be made 
between presumption of coverage and presumption that the jurisdictional require-
ment of the act had been met. "Jurisdiction must be first established, and when once 
shown, then and only then, does the coverage presumption become effective." Id. at 
885. 
38. See Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 344 F.2d 640, 647 n.l (2d Cir. 1965); 
Johnson v. Traynor, 243 F. Supp. 184, 195 (D. Md. 1965). More specifically, the 
court in Calbeck was dealing with the troublesome jurisdictional concept embodied 
in the "twilight zone" doctrine. This principle, first enunciated in Davis v. Depart-
ment of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942), was intended to counter the injustices resulting 
from the application of the "local concern" doctrine. Briefly, the latter theory allowed 
state compensation acts to be applied in cases involving injuries sustained on navi-
gable waters if the injured party's work was purely of "local concern." Usually situ-
ations where an employee who normally engaged in non-maritime activity was injured 
when he temporarily ventured onto navigable waters were deemed to be objects of 
local concern. See, e.g., Carlin Constr. Co. v. Heaney, 299 U.S. 41 (1936); Sultan Ry. & 
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the Court implicitly accepted the validity of applying the locality 
test in the initial determination whether an employee is covered by 
the Longshoremen's Act.89 
C. The Impact of Nielsen 
Two district court cases illustrate Nielsen's impact on the vital-
ity of the locality test. In 1963, before Nielsen, the Longshoremen's 
Act was held inapplicable where a longshoreman had been acci-
dentally lifted from a dock by a dock-based winch and dropped into 
Timber Co. v. Department of Labor, 277 U.S. 135 (1928); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. 
McManigal, 87 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1937). The local concern doctrine was developed 
prior to the enactment of the Longsboremen's Act (see Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. V, 
Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922)), in an attempt partially to fill the void left by Southern 
Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), whiclt had held that state compensation acts 
could not constitutionally cover injuries on navigable waters. Although the Long• 
shoremen's Act eliminated the void entirely, the local concern doctrine nevertheless 
continued to be applied, ironically as a defense to Longshorcmen's Act claims. Sec 
Gainsburgh & Fallon, supra note I, at 82-83. The continued viability of the doctrine 
was justified on the basis of the somewhat nebulous language in § 3 of the Long-
shoremen's Act, whiclt states that compensation is payable under the act only if it 
may not "validly be provided by State law." Moreover, because the area of "local 
concern" was never clearly defined, the dangers were great that an employee, by 
cltoosing the wrong forum, would incur unnecessary expense and possibly cause 
the statute of limitations on a claim under state law to expire. 
To mitigate these risks, the Court in Davis held that where the local nature of the 
employment was uncertain, the injured employee could proceed under state legislation 
or the federal act and an award under either would be sustained on appeal. This 
"twilight zone" rested upon two presumptions. First, where compensation has been 
awarded under the federal act, 28 U.S.C. § 920 (1964) is applicable; that section creates 
a presumption in favor of determinations by a federal agency. Second, where there 
have been no federal findings, but an award under a state act has been made, a pre• 
sumption of the constitutionality of state action is applicable. Moreover, receipt of 
benefits under a state act does not prevent an award of compensation under the 
federal act (see Western Boat B1dg. Co. v. O'Leary, 198 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1952); 
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. O'Heame, 192 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 
1951)), although sums received under state law are credited against the federal award. 
See Holland v. Harrison Bros. Dry Dock & Ship Repair Yard, Inc., 306 F.2d 369 (5th 
Cir. 1962). The Longshoremen's Act statute of limitations, § 13(a), is tolled while pay• 
ments are being made under a state act. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dry Dock v. 
Brown, 147 F.2d 265 (N.D. Ill. 1930). 
Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962), has apparently substantially 
altered the twilight zone doctrine by virtually eliminating the local concern theory. 
A thorough review of legislative history convinced the Supreme Court that "Congress in• 
tended the [federal] compensation act to have a coverage co-extensive with the limits 
of its authority and that [§ 3] ••• was placed in the act not as a relinquishment of 
of any part of the field whiclt Congress could validly occupy but only to save the 
act from judicial condemnation, by making it clear that it did not intend to legislate 
beyond its constitutional powers • • • ." Id. at 130. Thus, a welder working on a 
partially constructed barge floating on navigable waters was within the federal act 
regardless of local concern. Calbeck is deemed by some commentators to have elimi• 
nated the twilight zone. See, e.g., Gainsburgh & Fallon, supra note I; 50 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 
342 (1962). However, Till & Bluestein, supra note 1, have suggested otherwise, citing 
Holland v. Harrison Bros. Dry Dock & Repair Co., 306 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1962), ancl 
Matherenc v. Superior Oil Co., 207 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. La. 1962). 
39. See, e.g., Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra note 38, at 115-17, 119, 124•27, 
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the water behv-een the ship and the pier.4° Citing decisions which 
had turned upon the application of the "substance and consumma-
tion" version of the locality test, the court held that the injury frQm 
which the dispute had arisen had not been sustained on navigable 
waters and that the act was therefore irrelevant.41 In 1965, in· Gulf 
Oil Corp. v. O'Keeffe,42 however, the act was held to have covered 
a deceased engineer who had last been seen "ma,king an effort to get 
off the barge on to the dock [when] immediately thereafter a splash 
was heard."43 Completely ignoring the locality test, the court held, 
on the authority of Nielsen, that recovery under the Longshoremen's 
Act was proper regardless of whether the deceased had fallen from 
the dock or from the barge.44 
In contrast to the modification of the principles for applying the 
federal compensation act's jurisdictional requisites, recent cases have 
continued to rely upon the locality test in admiralty tort cases 
brought by or on behalf of persons who fall off docks into navigable 
waters.45 Indeed, the very court which decided Nielsen recently lim-
ited the applicability of its holding in that case to Longshoremen's 
Act jurisdictional controversies and applied the locality test in Wiper 
v. Great Lakes Engineering Works,46 where a claim was premised 
upon an admiralty tort theory. An inebriated ship's engineer had 
gone ashore at night to procure some equipment. His body was re-
covered three days later from the slip at which his vessel had been 
tied up; the cause of his death was found to have been asphyxia by 
drowning. After losing a Jones Act suit against his employer (the 
shipowner),47 decedent's widow sued the dock owner for having 
negligently failed to provide a safe mooring area. The trial court 
granted summary judgment for the defendant on the basis of Michi-
gan common law. On appeal, plaintiff argued that maritime law, 
rather than state law, was applicable. Since the dock, which for the 
purpose of testing the complaint on a motion to dismiss was pre-
sumed to have been the cause of decedent's fall, was an extension of 
land, the court held, on the basis of the locality test, -that maritime 
40, Atlantic Stevedoring v. O'Keeffe, 220 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Ga. 1963). 
41. The court relied upon Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647 
(1935), and T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928). See text accompanying 
note 23 supra. 
42, Gulf Oil Corp. v. O'Keeffe, 242 F. Supp. 881 (E.D.S.C. 1965). 
43. Id. at 882. 
44. Compare Boston Metals Co. v. O'Hearne, 329 F.2d 504 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
379 U.S. 824 (1964). The court in O'Keeffe probably could have reached the same 
result had it applied the locality test. See text accompanying note 24 supra. 
. 45. See, e.g., Hastings v. Mann, 340 F.2d 910 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 963 
(1965); Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1965). 
46, 340 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1965). 
47. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964), popu-
larly called the Jones Act, grants to seamen an FELA damage remedy against their 
employers. See generally note 3 supra. ' 
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law was inapplicable. The court reasoned that "the tort was com-
plete before decedent ever touched the water and this being true, 
the subsequent drowning is significant not to determine the mari-
time or non-maritime nature of this action but only as it relates to 
damages."48 It should be noted that while plaintiff's case here rested 
on the assumption that a defect in a dock had caused deceased's fall 
into the water, in Nielsen there was no evidence to indicate what 
had caused the victim to drive off the dock. Although the cases are 
thus distinguishable, the Nielsen court made no attempt to limit 
the effect of its holding to situations where no evidence of cause 
is presented, but implied that all injuries sustained by harbor work-
ers and consummated on navigable waters are compensable under 
the Longshoremen's Act regardless of their cause.40 Despite its lan-
guage in Nielsen, the court really did not feel that the Extension 
Act eliminated the locality test. 
D. Problems and Policy 
Even when the locality test was uniformly applied by the federal 
courts in harbor worker injury cases, there could be difficulties in 
determining whether relief was available under the Longshoremen's 
Act or under state compensation legislation.rm Now, when seemingly 
different standards are applied-the "consummation of the wrong 
and the injury" test and Nielsen's "consummation or 'situs' of the 
injury alone" formula-an attempt to predict the results of this 
determination in some cases must challenge the most experienced 
maritime lawyer.51 Moreover, a bad guess on the attorney's part 
can deprive an injured harbor worker of any remedy, for, although 
the statute of limitations applicable to suits under the Longshore-
men's Act is tolled while a harbor worker vainly pursues a state 
compensation remedy, the relevant limitation period on claims un-
der state compensation acts may continue to run while he seeks re-
dress under federal law.52 Thus, where the jurisdictional facts which 
48. Wiper v. Great Lakes Eng'r Works, 340 F.2d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 1965). 
49. Since the Admiralty Extension Act had been specifically designed to affect 
admiralty tort jurisdiction, the result in Wiper suggests that, despite its language in 
Nielsen, the Sixth Circuit did not actually feel that the Extension Act eliminated 
the locality test. 
50. See, e.g., The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649 (1935); T. Smith &: Son, Inc. v. Tay-
lor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928); Thibodeaux v. J. Ray McDermott&: Co., 276 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 
1960); Independence Indem. Co. v. Mansfield, 2 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); 
St. John v. Thomson, 108 Vt. 66, 182 Atl. 196 (1936). 
51. Compare Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 238 F. Supp. 78 (E.D. Va. 1965), 
with Hastings v. Mann, 340 F.2d 910 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 963 (1965). 
52. See Great Lakes Dredge &: Dock Co. v. Brown, 47 F.2d 265 (N.D. Ill. 1930), dis• 
cussing the federal act. The status of state law is demonstrated by Nielsen itself, 
where the Ohio workmen's compensation statute of limitations had run before the 
plaintiff was certain that she had a federal remedy. Brief for Respondent, p. 6 (peti• 
tion for certiorari), Interlake Steamship Co. v. Nielsen, 338 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1964). 
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must be proved to obtain relief under federal law are uncertain, it 
would be unwise for an injured harbor worker to seek the Long-
shoremen's Act remedy first, although the amount of recovery al-
lowed by state compensation legislation is usually substantially less 
than that provided by the federal statute.53 If Longshoremen's Act 
protection were found to be lacking, the untolled statute of limita-
tions on the claim arising under the relevant state legislation might 
have run in the meantime, and the injured employee would find 
· himself without any compensation _remedy.54 
Two possible explanations can be offered for the current judicial 
trend extending Longshoremen's Act coverage landward. First, the 
courts may have simply recognized that ·a navigable-waters jurisdic-
tional requirement in a workmen's compensation law ostensibly 
designed to afford relief to employees whose duties require them to 
divide their time between activities on land and on water is both 
illogical and impractical. Once the Longshoremen's Act has been 
invoked and compensation awarded, the hyper-technical distinctions 
which must be drawn in order to apply the locality test should not 
call for a reversal. Second, and probably more important, the courts 
are doubtless aware that Longshoremen's Act compensation awards 
can be more generous than the recoveries available under state legis-
lation for comparable injuries. Where picayune fact distinctions can 
determine whether the same injury is worth fifty-four dollars per 
month throughout the entire period of disability or only thirty dol-
lars monthly for a maximum of three hundred weeks,55 the tempta-
tion to give a plaintiff the benefit of the more generous federal scale 
should not be underestimated. 
While the motivation underlying these recent decisions may be 
admirable, the results leave much to be desired. Nielsen's new, im-
perfectly established jurisdictional test, which at most only gives an 
injured longshoreman the protection of the federal act if he was 
fortunate enough to sustain at least part of his injury on navigable 
waters, is no more logical than its predecessor; the longshoreman 
53. See generally U.S. Chamber of Commerce Analysis of Workmen's Compensation 
Laws Gan. 1962); id. (Supp. Jan. 1963); 30 N.A.C.C.A.L.J. 200, 205 (1964); 36 TuL. L. 
REv. 134, 137 (1961). Under certain circumstances an injured longshoreman may never-
theless desire to proceed under a state law, as, for example, where procedural rules 
may preclude recovery under the federal act (see Bryce v. Todd Shipyard, 17 App. Div. 
2d 666, 229 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1962)), or where the relevant state act may be more liberal in 
defining "total disability." See 36 TuL. L. REv. 134, 137 n.16 (1961). 
54. The prudent claimant may be able to protect himself against the running of 
the state statute of limitations by incurring the expense of double filing, for some 
state compensation acts contain statutes of limitations which are tolled when a claim 
is filed. See, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT. § 656.274 (1964). However, other state acts require 
the filing and prosecution of a claim within the limitation period. See, e.g., LA. REv. 
STAT. § 23:1209 (1964); 50 CALIF. L. REv. 342, 344 n.15, 346 n.38 (1962). 
55. Compare LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1231 (1964) with 70 Stat. 655 (1956), 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 908-09 (1964). See generally 36 TuL. L. REv. 134, 137 (1961). 
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is still covered:..__at least- potentially-by two disparate compensation 
laws. It seems that the zone of superficial distinctions and difficult 
fact determinations has merely been carried a few steps shoreward. 
II. AN INADEQUACY A.RISING FROM JUDICIAL LEGISLATION: 
THE DEMISE OF SECTION 5 
Section 5 of the Longshoremen's Act provides: 
The liability of an employer ... [for compensation ascertained 
by reference to a standard schedule] shall be exclusive and in 
place of all other liability of such employer to the employee, 
his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, 
next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages 
... on account of such injury or death .... 56 
This provision, typical for a compensation act, imposes upon an 
employer limited and determinate liability in exchange for his 
bearing liability for an employee's injury regardless of whether the 
harm can be attributed to the employer's fault. 57 However, recent 
decisions call into serious question the continued efficacy of this 
apparently unequivocal provision; the longshoreman can now often 
recover, either directly or indirectly, damages unlimited in amount 
from his stevedore-employer.68 Since the stevedore normally does not 
own the ship with which the victim was connected at the time of 
injury, a two-step procedure must generally be employed in order 
to circumvent section 5. 
A. The First Step: Recovery Against the Shipowner--The 
Seaworthiness Doctrine 
The Longshoremen's Act, in conformity with other workmen's 
compensation legislation, preserves the injured employee's ordinary 
rights against any party responsible for the harm other than his 
immediate employer.69 Since most injuries to longshoremen occur 
56. 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964). 
57. See Stover, Longshoreman-Shipowner-Stevedore: The Circle of Liability, 61 
MICH. L. REv. 539, 542 (1963). It is suggested in McKinstry, The Yaka Decision-Judi• 
cial Repeal of Section 5 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation 
Act, 31 INs. COUNSEL J. 90 (1964), that the Supreme Court in Crowell v. Benson, 285 
U.S. 22, 37 (1932), characterized the exclusive liability provision of § 5 as fundamental 
to the constitutionality of the act. This seems to be a somewhat strained interpretation 
of the case, however, for it appears that the Court actually said only that the navi• 
gable-waters requirement and the existence of a master-servant relationship between 
an injured employee and an employer-defendant were essential to the constitutional 
application of the act. See Crowell v. Benson, supra, at 37-38. 
58. See, e.g., Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963); DeGioia v. United States 
Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962). 
59. 73 Stat. 391 (1959), 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1964). See generally Pillsbury, Stevedore's 
Duty To Indemnify Shipowners for Injuries to Longshoremen-Employees, 15 HASTINGS 
L.J. 530 (1964). Once an injured longshoreman accepts compensation under a compen• 
(l 
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around vessels during the course of loading or unloading, damage 
suits against shipowners are common. 60 In such actions, a longshore-
man has recourse to a potent remedy once reserved for seamen alone: 
the seaworthiness doctrine imposing liability without fault. 61 When 
a shipmvner warrants by implication that his vessel is seaworthy, he 
is bound to provide a ship free of structural defects as well as defec-
tive machinery, equipment, and tackle. 62 A shipowner can also be 
liable on an unseaworthiness theory for injuries attributable to an 
unfit crew,63 the improper stowage of cargo,64 and even defective 
equipment supplied by a stevedore but used in conjunction with the 
ship.611 Furthermore, under maritime law, assumption of risk is not 
a defense to unseaworthiness liability, and contributory negligence 
does not preclude relief but merely mitigates the amount of recovery 
on a comparative-fault basis.66 
While the seaworthiness doctrine originally gave rise to a cause 
of action only for injuries caused by defects directly connected with 
the ship or its appurtenances, the warranty has ventured landward 
via recent judicial decisions in a manner markedly similar to that 
sation order, § 33(b) provides for the automatic assignment of all his rights against 
third parties to his employer unless the injured employee commences an action 
against the third party within six months of the award. See McClendon v. Charente 
S.S. Co., 227 F. Supp. 256 (S.D. Tex. 1964). But cf. Leonard v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
267 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1959). 
60. See, e.g., Mortensen v. Glittre, 348 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1965); Albanese v. N.V. 
Nederl. Amerik. Stoomv. Maats., 346 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1965); Misurella v. Isthmian 
Lines, Inc., 328 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1964). 
61. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960); Seas• Shipping Co. v. 
Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). Sieracki is the landmark case which first extended sea-
worthiness warranty liability for longshoremen's shipboard injuries. The Sieracki 
holding, originally construed narrowly to apply only to longshoremen (Guerrini v. 
United States, 167 F.2d 352 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 843 (1948)), was extended 
to encompass all harbor workers in Pope &: Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953). 
The injured longshoreman, as a business invitee, may also have a negligence cause of 
action against the shipowner. Ibid. 
The Court in Sieracki justified its extension of seaworthiness protection to long-
shoremen on the ground that, historically, a vessel was unloaded by members of the 
crew. "[The longshoreman is], in short, a seaman because he is doing a seaman's 
work •••• " Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, supra, at 99. The historical accuracy of the 
Court's premise has been convincingly challenged in Shields &: Byrne, Application of 
the "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine to Longshoremen, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1137, 1139-47 
Q96~. . 
62. See Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 213 (1963); Mesle v. 
Kea S.S. Corp., 260 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966 (1959); Di Salvo v. 
Cunard S.S. Co., 171 F. Supp. 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Bishop v. Alaska S.S. Co., 404 P.2d 
990 (Wash. 1965). See generally Stover, supra note 57; 36 TuL. L. REv. 329 (1962). 
63. See Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955); Keen v. Overseas 
Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1952). 
64. See Morales v. City of Galveston, 370 U.S. 165 (1962). 
65. Rogers v. United States Lines, 347 U.S. 984 (1954); Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 
347 U.S. 396 (1954). 
66. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale, 358 U.S. 625, 629 (1959) (contributory neg-
ligence); Pope &: Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 408 (1953) (contributory negli-
gence); Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1939) (assumption of 
risk); The Arizona v. Anelick, 298 U.S. 110 (1936) (assumption of risk). 
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of the remedy provided by the Longshoremen's Act.67 For example, 
recovery has been allowed when a longshoreman slipped upon sand 
which had seeped from bags as they were being removed from a 
truck after they had been unloaded from a vessel.68 Similarly, a long-
shoreman injured by a defective land-based hopper which was not 
attached to a vessel in any manner recovered damages in an unsea-
worthiness action. 69 In each case, recovery was rationalized on the 
ground that since the plaintiff had been engaged in an unloading 
process which was one continuous operation, he had been in the 
ship's service although he had been standing on land. The eventual 
limits of this new expansion are far from settled or even foresee-
able. 70 It is perhaps ironic, however, that this traditional maritime 
remedy has ventured much farther inland than has relief afforded 
by the federal compensation act, which was specifically intended to 
protect the longshoreman but which even under the liberal Nielsen 
view can be the basis for recovery only if his injury has its "situs" 
on the water. 
B. The Second Step: Shipowner's Recovery From the Stevedore-
Employer--The Indemnity Doctrine 
Where a shipowner has been rendered liable for damages due to 
an unseaworthy condition wholly or partially brought about by a 
stevedore, it is understandable that he would look to that stevedore 
for redress. In 1952, the Supreme Court rejected a shipowner's argu-
ment that he had a right to contribution against the stevedore based 
on the mutual-fault rule regularly applied in ship collision cases, 
by which contributory negligence is not a defense but damages are 
apportioned according to the fault attributable to each vessel's 
owner.71 The Court felt that expanding the application of this prin-
ciple beyond the collision context would amount to judicial legis-
lation; thus, the normal tort rule disallowing contribution among 
joint tortfeasors prevailed. 72 
67. Compare The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903), with Gutierrez v. Waterman Steam• 
ship Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963), and Hagans v. Ellerman &: Buchnall S.S. Co., 196 
F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1961). In Gutierrez, where the Supreme Court first extended 
the seaworthiness remedy dockside, a longshoreman had slipped on beans spilled 
from defective bags. In the Court's view, the application of the Admiralty Extension 
Act, 62 Stat. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964) (see generally text accompanying note 
34 supra) was not limited to cases where damage on land was caused by the vessel or 
by a particular part of it, but also extended to instances where a shipowner had 
committed a tort before the ship had been completely unloaded, if the impact of the 
misconduct was felt ashore at a time and place not too remote from the wrongful act, 
68. Hagans v. Ellerman &: l3uchnall S.S. Co., supra note 67. 
69. Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1965). 
70. Compare Forkin v. Furness Withy &: Co., 323 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1963), with 
Huff v. Matson Nav. Co., 338 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1964). 
71. See Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling&: Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952), 
72. The court expressly refused to consider the effect of § 5 on the rights of the 
shipowner against the stevedore, Id. at 286 n.12. 
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Nevertheless, in 1956 the Supreme Court accomplished even 
more than it had refused to undertake four years earlier.73 In the 
landmark case of Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.,74 
the Court affirmed a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit that indemnity over in the full amount of any verdict 
obtained against him may be had by a shipowner from an employer-
stevedore whose negligence was the "sole," "active," or "primary" 
cause of a longshoreman's injury. However, the Court's affirmation 
was not based upon any concept of primary responsibility.75 Al-
though there is some dispute among the commentators regarding 
the precise rationale behind the ruling, at least it is clear that sec-
tion 5 was circumvented by basing the shipowner's recovery on an 
implied contract benv-een himself and the stevedore; therefore, the 
shipowner's right to indemnity did not arise "on account of" the 
injury to the employee, as this phrase is used in section 5.76 While 
the exact nature of this implied contract is uncertain, it has been 
suggested that in contracting with a shipowner a stevedore auto-
matically warrants that he will perform his services in a workman-
like manner and that from this implicit obligation springs a further 
implied agreement by which the stevedore is said to have promised 
to indemnify the shipowner for damages resulting from unwork-
manlike conduct.77 , 
The far-reaching effect of Ryan can be illustrated by a recent 
case in which an independent contractor's employee, a "harbor 
worker" within the meaning of the act, slipped on an oil slick while 
painting insignia on the funnel of a vessel.78 The painter, alleging 
unseaworthiness, sued the shipowner, who thereupon impleaded the 
employer-contractor, claiming a right of indemnification if the em-
ployee should recover in the principal action. The jury found that 
the presence of the oil slick had rendered the ship unseaworthy, but 
73. See generally McKinstry, supra note 57. 
74. 350 U.S. 124 (1956), affirming Palazzolo v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 211 F.2d 277 
(2d Cir. 1954). 
75. Indeed, the Supreme Court bas since expressly indicated that the terms "active" 
and "passive" negligence have no role in indemnity cases. See Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. 
Nacirema Operations Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958). ' 
76. See generally 2 l.AR.soN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LA.w § 76.10, at 229 (Supp. 
1965); Pillsbury, supra note 59, at 547-48; Stover, supra note 57, at 550; 38 TUL. L. 
R.Ev. 202, 203-04 (1964); 37 id. 786, 790 (1963). 
77. See Pillsbury, supra note 59, at 544-49. Much of the confusion may stem from 
the dissent in Ryan, which discussed the majority holding in terms of a contract im-
plied in fact to indemnify a shipowner for injuries to a stevedore's employees caused 
by the shipowner's negligence, rather than in terms of an implied contract by which 
a stevedore agrees to indemnify the shipowner for losses sustained because the steve-
dore's service was not performed in a workmanlike manner. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. 
Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 141-44 (1956) (Black, J., dissenting). The dissent 
indicated that this implied contract gave rise to liability "on account of" the long-
shoreman's injury and was clearly violative of § 5. 
78. Mortensen v. Glittre, 348 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1965). 
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because the employee had been guilty of contributory negligence 
in failing to wipe up the oil after he had discovered it, the jury re-
duced by one third the amount to which it felt the victim would 
otherwise have been entitled. The trial court then directed a verdict 
in favor of the shipowner and against the contractor for the full 
amount of the jury award, on the ground that the employee's con-
tributory negligence, imputed to his employer, established as a mat• 
ter of law the shipowner's right to full indemnity. 
In view of the recent trend toward extending shoreward the 
protection of the seaworthiness remedy, few would argue that section 
5 of the Longshoremen's Act continues to offer great solace to the 
stevedore. A high proportion of the injuries occurring during load-
ing or unloading operations are probably attributable in some way 
both to an unseaworthy vessel, appurtenance, or crew and also to 
some unworkmanlike conduct on the part of the stevedore or his 
employee. In this regard it must be remembered that a shipowner 
can be held for breaching his seaworthiness warranty if the stevedore 
supplies defective equipment.79 Under these circumstances a ship-
owner's recovery of indemnity over, even when he and the stevedore 
are mutually at fault, is bound to be a frequent occurrence.80 
C. A Shortcut 
In the comparatively rare instance where a longshoreman's em-
ployer is also the owner of the vessel with which the longshoreman 
was associated at the time of injury, the logical extension of the 
Ryan rationale would indicate that the longshoreman must be satis-
fied with his compensation remedy. Since the stevedore and the &hip-
owner are the same, section 5 certainly cannot be circumvented on 
the basis of an implied consensual agreement between the owner 
and stevedore. However, in Reed v. The Yaka81 the Supreme Court 
concluded that "only blind adherence to the superficial meaning of 
a statute"82 could deprive such an employee of an opportunity to 
try for more than the Longshoremen's Act has to offer. In Reed, a 
longshoreman who had been injured when his foot went through a 
79. The extent of the seaworthiness doctrine can hardly be overestimated, For 
example, the shipowner's warranty clearly, extends to equipment owned and supplied 
by a stevedore. See Rogers v. United States Lines, 347 U.S. 984 (1954): Alaska S.S. Co, 
v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954). "The only case which is today clearly outside the 
scope of the unseaworthiness doctrine is the almost theoretical construct of an injury 
whose only cause is an order improvidently given by a concededly competent officer 
on a ship admitted to be in all respects seaworthy." GILMORE &: BLACK, ADMIRALTY 820 
QM~ . 
80. See Pillsbury, supra note 59, at 559-61; Stover, supra note 57, at 562, The ship• 
owner may also recover from the stevedore the costs of defending against the unsea• 
worthiness claim. See Di Vittorio v. Skiles A/S Siljestad, 244 F. Supp. 48 (S,D.N,Y. 
1965). 
81. 373 U.S. 410 (1963). 
82. Id. at 414-15. 
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latently defective pallet on board a ship libelled the vessel, and its 
owner impleaded the longshoreman's employer, who happened also 
to be the bareboat charterer of the craft at the time of the injury. 
A bareboat charterer is regarded the owner for purposes of warrant-
ing the seaworthiness of a vessel and, thus, is personally liable in 
place of the actual owner on unseaworthiness claims.83 Therefore, 
section 5 would seem unequivocally to have prevented the victim 
from bringing an unseaworthiness action. Nevertheless, the Court 
noted the cases allowing a longshoreman to recover on such a theory 
where the stevedore was not directly responsible for a ship's sea-
worthiness, and declared that to deprive the longshoreman of his 
seaworthiness remedy in this case "would produce a harsh and incon-
gruous result."84 Thus, despite the highly pertinent and seemingly 
unqualifiedly prohibitive language of section 5, coupled with the 
impossibility of basing .the result on an implied contract concept 
as had been done in Ryan, the Court allowed the libellant to bring 
a damage action directly against his employer in lieu of pursuing his 
compensation remedy. Reed is thus an excellent example of the 
conscious judicial legislation which has made the Longshoremen's 
Act unworkable. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Longshoremen's Act was designed to provide the injured 
harbor worker with a swift, certain and inexpensive remedy.85 In 
light of the recent cases discussed above, it is clear that these goals 
have not been achieved. The act's illogical and impractical juris-
dictional basis has resulted in extensive litigation and confusion, 
which show no signs of diminishing. With its promise of more gen-
erous damage awards, the seaworthiness approach, which, taken to-
gether with a losing shipowner's inevitable search for indemnity, 
normally results in the additional expense associated with impleader 
or a second lawsuit, has supplanted to a significant degree the rela-
tively simple and inexpensive administrative . compensation pro-
ceedings. Inevitably, where extensive litigation is required, larger 
attorneys' fees reduce the value of the injured longshoreman's recov-
ery; the prospect of larger damage awards can therefore be more 
illusory than real.86 
83. See Cannella v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 174 F.2d 794 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 
U.S. 859 (1949); Vitozi v. Balboa Shipping Co., 163 F.2d 286 (1st Cir. 1947); cf. Loe v. 
Goldstein, 101 F.2d 967 (9th Cir. 1939). . 
84. Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 415 (1963). The Court paid particular attention 
to Ryan and Sieracki. 
85. See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 159 (1932); Stover, supra 
note 57, at 542. 
86. In Shields &: Byrne, supra note 61, at 1150, it is asserted that approximately 
40% of the total estimated cost to the maritime industry of the extension of the 
seaworthiness doctrine is attributable to lawyers' fees. Compare Conard, Workmen's 
1570 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 64:1553 
Even while the proposed legislation which became the Long-
shoreman's Act was under consideration in Congress, legal scholars, 
labor union representatives, and the Department of Labor urged 
that the compensation scheme cover longshoremen and harbor 
workers regardless of where they were injured, as long as the harm 
that they suffered arose in the course of their employment.87 Al-
though there may have been doubts in 1927 that Congress could 
enact such comprehensive legislation, it is clear that if these sugges-
tions were heeded today, the commerce clause would supply the 
constitutional authority for the enactment of a statute based upon 
them.88 Coherence and ease of administration would further be 
served if the act covered only those engaged in typical longshoreman 
occupations in which they were consistently required to work near 
the water's edge. The present act covers to an uncertain degree the 
occasional visitor to navigable waters, such as an electronic-equip-
ment repairman.80 There is no compelling reason to place this kind 
of employee, who is invariably within the ambit of state workmen's 
compensation legislation, under the Longshoremen's Act simply be-
cause he is temporarily working on a moored vessel, for it is now 
clear that state compensation laws may constitutionally cover him 
even when he is injured on navigable waters.00 
Compensation: Is It More Efficient Than Employer's Liability?, 38 A.B.A.J. 1011 
(1952), where it is tentatively suggested that the damage remedy provided by the 
Federal Employer's Liability Act is more efficient than workmen's compensation relief 
in terms of cost per dollar of benefit conferred. 
In Shields &: Byrne, supra note 61, at 1147-48, it is noted that in one case, Holley 
v. The Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. Va. 1960), the longshoreman's widow's 
net recovery on an unseaworthiness theory, after a 50% reduction in her award to 
accommodate lawyers' fees, was $1,597.45 out of a gross cost to the employer, largely 
attributable to defending in the indemnity action, of $24,293.71. It is estimated that 
under the Longshoremen's Act she would have received $23,790.65. Since 73 Stat, 391 
(1959), 33 U.S.C. § 933(£) (1964), provides that where recovery against the third party 
is less than the compensation recovery would have been, compensation will be awarded 
to make up the difference, the widow did not suffer, but the total expenditure re• 
quired on the part of the em_ployer was $46,486.91. 
87. See Johnson v. Traynor, 243 F. Supp. 184 (D. Md. 1965); Clark, The Longshore• 
man and Accident Compensation, 22 MoNTIILY LAlloR R.Ev. 753, 766 (1926). 
88. See Atlantic Stevedoring Co. v. O'Keeffe, 220 F. Supp. 881, 883 (S.D. Ga. 1963), 
and authorities cited in note 87 supra. 
89. Compare Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962), with Bethlehem 
Steel Co. v. Moores, 335 U.S. 874 (1948), and Holland v. Harrison Bros. Dry Dock &: 
Repair Yard, Inc., 306 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1962). See discussion of local concern and twi• 
light zone doctrines in note 38 supra. 
90. See, e.g., Carlin Constr. Co. v. Heaney, 299 U.S. 41 (1936); Grant Smith-Porter 
Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. McManigal, 87 F,2d 
332 (2d Cir. 1937). These cases utilized the local concern doctrine, discussed in note 38 
supra, to allow state compensation acts to apply constitutionally to some injuries on 
- navigable waters. Uncertainties generated by the local concern principle resulted in 
the formulation of the twilight zone doctrine, which in effect allowed either the 
federal or state compensation acts to apply to local concern cases. Sec generally note 38 
supra. It is arguable that Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962), has elim• 
inated both the twilight zone and the local concern doctrines, not on constitutional 
grounds, however, but rather because the Court felt that Congress intended the 
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Because policy factors are both numerous and complex, a perfect 
solution to the seaworthiness-indemnity approach, which virtually 
destroys the significance of section 5, is not readily apparent. Al-
though the judicial repeal of section 5 seems difficult to justify, and 
the most apparent solution to the current problem would be to 
force the shipowner to bear the full loss occasioned by a breach of 
his seaworthiness warranty, the resulting burden on the shipowner 
may be intolerable if the longshoreman, lured by potentially high 
damage awards, persistently pursues his seaworthiness remedy rather 
than his compensation remedy. Indeed, before the Court in Ryan 
allowed indemnity over, stevedores customarily made voluntary 
compensation payments to injured employees despite the absence 
of a formal award under the act, in order to tide the longshoreman 
over while, with the stevedore's blessing, he pursued his seaworthi-
ness remedy against the shipowner. Since these payments were made 
informally, there was no statutory assignment of the longshoreman's 
potential cause of action against the shipuwner to the stevedore, who 
would have made a less appealing plaintiff.91 Thus the possibility 
was increased that the shipuwner would ultimately bear the burden 
of injuries to longshoremen. The longshoreman has nothing to lose 
by pursuing his remedy against the shipowner, because if his recov-
ery is less than his compensation remedy would have been, compen-
sation will be awarded to make up the difference.92 Because of these 
Longshoremen's Act to cover all injuries on navigable waters. It has been suggested 
that strict reliance on this "water's edge" rule will "provide a simple practical means 
for determining whether an injured man's remedy in compensation shall be under 
state or under federal law." Gainsburgh & Fallon, Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co.: 
The Twilight's Last Gleaming?, 37 TuL. L. REv. 79, 87-88 (1962). 
While the simplicity and practicality of applying the navigable-waters jurisdictional 
requirement is questionable, a valid warning is implicit in the judicial history of 
which Calbeck is a part: care must be taken not to incorporate all of the "local 
concern" difficulties into any new longshoremen's legislation. Employment which is 
essentially similar to that of the longshoreman or harbor worker should be carefully 
defined. Part of the prior confusion which arose in applying the local concern doctrine 
stemmed from the fact that the principle represented ·a judicial exception to the 
normal coverage of the Longshoremen's Act, and was employed on a case-by-case 
basis, with the result that the exact extent of the doctrine was never clearly dis-
cernible. 
Collaterally, it· should be noted that some have suggested that Congress could 
now constitutionally place all maritime workers under the state compensation acts, 
because all states have compensation acts that are essentially similar, so the uniformity 
of the general maritime law would not be affected if state law were applied. See 
Allen, That "Twilight Zone" Between the Jurisdictions of State and Federal C'?111'pen-
sation Acts, 16 !Ns. CouNSEL J. 202, 207 (1949); Rodes, Workmen's Compensation for 
Maritime Employees: Obscurity in The Twilight Zone, 68 HARv. L. REV. 637, 656 
(1955). 
91. GILMORE &: BLACK, ADMIRALTY 370-71 (1957). This practice of making informal 
awards will probably be eliminated by a recent amendment to § 33, 73 Stat. 391 
(1959), 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1964), which makes acceptance of compensation from an 
employer an assignment only if the longshoreman fails to commence an action against 
the shipowner within six months. 
92, See 73 Stat. 391 (1959), 33 U.S.C. § 933(1) (1964). 
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factors, the courts probably employed the indemnity-over the6ry to 
aid in alleviating the developing financial distress of the American 
shipping industry.93 Moreover, the American shipowner is less able 
than the stevedore to pass on the cost of longshoreman injuries to 
the consumer because he must compete with foreign carriers, while 
the stevedore unloading only in American ports has no foreign 
competition. 
Of course, an effort to exclude the longshoreman from the scope 
of protection of the seaworthiness warranty with its attendant lia-
bility without fault would reduce the shipowners' burden and make 
indemnity unnecessary. Some commentators have questioned the 
propriety of extending the seaworthiness warranty to longshoremen 
in the first place.94 However, it must be remembered that the long-
shoreman performs much of his work in the "plant" of one who is 
not his employer. Thus he must labor in surroundings which are 
inevitably unfamiliar and sometimes hazardous. The spectre of un-
seaworthiness liability undoubtedly provides an incentive for the 
shipowner to keep his vessel in good order. 
Ideally, where a shipowner and a stevedore have both been re-
sponsible for a longshoreman's injury, each should share the burden 
according to the extent to which he was at fault. However, under 
current law, the stevedore in most cases ultimately bears the entire 
loss.95 At least two methods for distributing the cost of compensating 
longshoremen for their injuries may be posited. The first possible 
solution is to allow indemnity only to the extent of the stevedore's 
compensation liability.96 Under this doctrine, the stevedore would 
receive the full benefit of the determinate-liability concept embod-
ied in section 5, while the shipowner would be relieved of the bur-
den of paying the total amount awarded to a longshoreman in an 
unseaworthiness action. On the other hand, perhaps it would be 
more desirable to grant the longshoreman a damage remedy similar 
to that found in the Jones Act and the FELA,97 where the fellow-
servant and assumption-of-risk defenses are eliminated and where 
comparative negligence replaces contributory negligence,98 but 
against both stevedore and shipowner with the burden also distrib-
uted be1'veen them on a comparative-fault basis.99 Of course, under 
93. See Shields &: Byrne, supra note 61, at 1148-51; Stover, supra note 57, at 563. 
94. See Pillsbury, supra note 59, at 564; Shields &: Byrne, supra note 61, at 1151. 
95. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operation Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958); 
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956); cf. Atlantic &: 
Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, rehearing denied, 369 U.S. 
882 (1962). 
96. See generally Pillsbury, supra note 59, at 542. 
97. See note 47 supra. 
· 98. See generally 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw §§ 91.00-.77 (1961). 
99. See Flowers v. Travelers Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 220, 225 (5th Cir. 1958). See generally 
Conard, supra note 86, where it is suggested that the F.E.L.A. is more efficient than 
workmen's compensation in terms of cost per dollar of benefit rendered. 
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the latter alternative all other remedies against the stevedore and 
shipovmer, including the seaworthiness warranty, would have to be 
eliminated. This procedure would theoretically have the advantage 
of distributing the burden more precisely according to every party's 
(plaintiff's as well as defendants') respective fault. The former alter-
native, while distributing the burden less precisely, would give the 
seaman assurance of compensation for injuries with the possibility 
of seeking additional damages for unseaworthiness. 
The role of weighing these policy factors and selecting among 
these and other alternatives properly belongs to Congress.100 The 
recent judicial decisions discussed above, perhaps attempting to 
compensate for congressional inaction, have reached results both 
inefficient and impractical. 
Robert E. Gilbert 
100. After refusing to allow recovery over by a shipowner against a harbor worker's 
employer on a contribution theory, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, declared: 
"Many groups of persons with varying interests are vitally concerned with the proper 
functioning and administration of all these acts [the Longshoremen's Act; Jones Act; 
Public Vessels Act, etc.] as an integrated whole. We think that legislative considera• 
tion and action can best bring about a fair accommodation of the diverse but related 
interests of these groups. The legislative process is peculiarly adapted to determine 
which of the many possible solutions to this problem would be most beneficial in the 
long run. The record before us is silent as to the wishes of employers, carriers, and 
shippers; it only shows that the Halcyon Line is in favor of such a change in order 
to relieve itself of a part of its burden in this particular lawsuit." Halcyon Lines v. 
Haenn Ship Ceiling&: Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 286 (1951). 
